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Abstract: Current cross-national organisational theory remains tied to stark 
polarisation between convergence and divergence, universal and relative, frames of 
analysis. Attempts at synthesis between these forces allow for, but do not always 
explain, why the organisation of work should be constantly pressured to conform 
to one particular 'best practice'. Our approach examines three sources of external 
influence on work organisation practices: (i) the economic mode of production; (ii) 
national legacies and institutional patterns; and (iii) 'best practice' or universal 
modernisation strategies generated and diffused by the 'society-in-dominance' 
within the global economy at a particular period of time. In other words, the 
influences upon work within a particular country are the result of a three-way 
interaction of what we call system effects, societal effects and dominance effects. All 
societies are marked by these three influences, although the order of influence 
varies historically and between societies. 
SYSTEM, SOCIETY AND DOMINANCE 
EFFECTS IN CROSS-NATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS 
Chris Smith and Peter Meiksins 
Introduction 
Recent comparative studies of labour and management across European 
societies, debates on the diffusion of Japanese working practices, and those 
around 'new production concepts' have highlighted the competing pres-
sures of convergence and divergence in industrial societies. Are organisa-
tional methods and theories culture-bound or culture free? Can supposedly 
'Japanese' practices transfer to other societies? Are we entering a new era of 
'post-fordism' or a pluralistic phase of national and regional organisa-tional 
diversity? These questions, with their different objects, levels and units of 
analysis highlight the need for theoretical clarity in cross-national 
organisational research. They also suggest that tensions between divergence 
and convergence, noted in earlier comparative research discussed below, are 
being re-invented and repeated in the new discourse of cross-national 
leartling and diffusion largely inspired by the decline of American economic 
hegemony and the spectacular growth of Japan. Our objective in this paper 
is to develop a model for comparative organisational analysis which will 
clarify the new and old debates and propose a method for explaining and 
exploring cross-national differences through a synthesis of the forces of 
convergence and divergence. 
Cross-national Divergence and Convergence in Organisations 
The dominant schools within classical management thought and organisa-
tional sociology assumed efficiency imperatives created 'one best way' of 
managing irrespective of cultural or national context. Taylor, Barnard and 
Mayo sought to develop universal management principles which, although 
influenced in terms of their implementation by national differences, would 
be generally used as single 'best practices'. Whatever differences in organis-
ing existed between societies would, over time, be subsumed by superior 
general efficiency methods and practices. At a macro-level, the convergence 
theory of Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers (1960) suggested that, despite 
differing routes into 'industrial society', work within it would 
look increasingly similar. This was because science and technology were 
universal ingredients of all 'industrial societies', and the long term solvents 
of national and cultural differences. 
Contingency theory argued that firm structure and social relations were 
largely free from cultural influence. Authors subscribing to a contingency 
perspective assumed that the task environment, product market, size of 
firm, its form and structure or its production technology were the key 
influences on management, occupational structure and work organisation; 
and that these 'contingents' were 'culture-free' (Chandler 1962; Blauner 
1964; Woodward 1965; Hickson et al. 1979). 
Classical management theory, convergence and contingency perspectives 
could not, however, explain the persistence of significant national organisa-
tional and social differences across 'industrial' societies, except perhaps in 
terms of lags and dubious notions of 'backwardness'. Cross-national 
research which held constant economy, technology, product, firm size and 
other task 'contingents' found underlying differences in labour processes, 
occupational structures and management styles that could only be attri-
buted to the persistence of national differences and the unique attitudes 
these generated (Gallie 1978; Child and Keiser 1979; Maurice, Sellier and 
Silvestre 1979; Maurice, Sorge and Warner 1980). Such cross-national 
organisational research provoked a re-evaluation of the role played by 
political economic systems, history, tradition and culture in sustaining 
diversity within organisations across different societies. 
However, such approaches were not without problems. Difficulties in 
operationalising such pervasive and slippery concepts as culture and 
tradition - what to include and exclude - resulted in critical analysis shift-
ing to the agencies of social reproduction responsible for imparting national 
messages to each generation of workers and managers: namely, social 
institutions. State and civil institutions, such as education, vocational 
training patterns, occupational formations, employment relations and trade 
unions were identified as transmitting distinct identities, qualifications, 
skills and training to German, French and British managers and workers 
who, in tum, carried these competencies and attitudes into the workplace 
to sustain national variance. At the level of the organisation, these 'institu-
tionalist' accounts of national distinctiveness rested on supply-side assump-
tions that organisations are largely determined by their inputs: different 
ingredients producing different national cakes. At the macro-level, they 
suggest that the constitution of the firm and its relationship to banks, the 
state and other political and economic actors are socially constructed within 
different national environments. The rise of institutionalist explanations for 
cross-national organisational variance represents a bringing into focus of the 
state and an associated playing down of the power of the economy, 
technology and the market. Nation states and national history sustain 
differences, while the economy promotes the cosmopolitan. However, as 
all economies exist within nation states, diversity is normal. Economic 
exigencies are mediated by national institutions, yielding different ways in 
which managers and workers relate to each other, their firms and their 
integration into the wider society. 
Institutional analysis tended to focus on and reinforce national differ-
ences. The immediate problem with this perspective was to explain the 
dynamic nature of change within economies which are increasingly global, 
not nationally bounded systems. If British management reflects British 
social and economic institutions, how does the nationality of the firm 
influence this equation? Are British managers in Japanese or American 
Transnational Companies (INCs) in Britain different in style, authority 
and attitude because of firm ownership? Is the management style Japanese 
or British? 
Highlighting the institutions of a specific nation state reinforces a 
tendency to make them appear permanent, stable forces of social repro-
duction. This is untenable in an era of internationalisation of capital, when 
open economies, like the British, become home to powerful TNCs from 
more dominant economies, like that of Japan or the U.S. Conversely, there 
is also the opposite problem in treating some national systems as 'models', 
and hence removing them from historical evolution and elevating them to 
standards against which to judge other societies. This is especially the case 
with comparative analysis between economically dominant and weaker 
states. Hence, the U.S., Germany and Japan are most frequently used as 
'models'. They are treated as 'modem' and 'given'; their historical evolution 
has all but ceased, as they provide 'best practice' ideals from which 
other societies can borrow and learn. For some writers, especially North 
American enthusiasts for 'Japanese' production, discussed below, other 
societies create competitive imperatives which fuel pressures for borrowing 
and diffusion, if not 'convergence'. By transposing national patterns of 
organisation into 'models', institutional analysis reverts back to 'one best 
way' and convergence theory - which was, after all, premised on the rest of 
the world copying the U.S. Hence, we can say there is an ambiguous attitude 
toward divergence and convergence pressures within institutional analysis. 
Institutionalists identified a critical weakness in convergence/one best way 
approaches: their inability to explain the persistence of significant national 
differences in economic organisations over long periods of time. They 
shifted organisational research towards comparative, cross-national studies 
which focused on the sources of national differences. However, these 
exercises in comparison analysis tended to let a kind of universalism in 
through the back door- certain national practices were held up as 'models' 
of 'best practice'. The debate about convergence/divergence was not 
resolved. The persistent ambivalence of organisational theorists regard- ing 
these opposing dynamics is revealed by a review of recent comparative, 
cross-national approaches. 
New Debates and Old Problems 
Comparative cross-national approaches currently have two dominant 
schools. First, there are a variety of writers pursuing research on universal-
ism and organisational contingency theory, supported by the diffusion of 
new methods of production and organisation inspired partially by Japan and 
the spread ofJapanese investment abroad. Second, there are writers inspired 
by what we have called the 'institutionalist' or societal effects approach, 
examining the nature of national business systems and societal differences 
in work organisation. In the following section, we examine these two 
schools, focusing on their combined inability to resolve the 
convergence/divergence problem in a coherent way. 
From Japan to 'new production concepts' 
The debate around what some German industrial sociologists have called 
'new production concepts' (Kern and Schumann 1984) has highlighted the 
tensions between universally applicable models of new methods and 
standards of production, and persisting divergences between countries. This 
debate has powerful European (especially German) and North American 
enthusiasts, and is cast as a reaction to the work of Braverman ( 197 4) on 
de-skilling and Taylorism as an intrinsically capitalist or systemic feature of 
all industrial societies. Within the post-Braverman debate, both national 
variations in the organisation of the labour process and systemic alternatives 
to Taylorism were central. However, there has been a tension between these 
two positions, with American authors, in the main, choosing to promote 
universal post-fordist and post-Taylorist prescriptions and panaceas, 
whereas European writers have either insisted that there has been no 'end 
to mass production' (typical of British writing) or suggested distinctly 
national forms of diversity, as in the 'Swedish' model of car production (for 
example Berggren 1992). 
American Writing 
In the U.S. there has been discussion of 'new production concepts'-
whether as 'high tech cottage industry', 'flexible specialisation', 'lean 
production' or 'innovation-mediated production'. Italy and Japan have 
featured strongly as societal templates for new innovations towards 'post-
fordism'. Sabel (1982) initially identified 'the end of mass production' as 
occurring in central Italy and tied to quite specific national and local 
political conditions. However, in his book with Piore in 1984, the term 
'flexible specialisation' (borrowed from an Italian economist) was projected 
as a universal, not local, framework through which to interpret global 
changes in the organisation of work. In other words, while Italian pro-
duction diversity assisted thinking -about differences in labour process 
organisation, very quickly a universal 'one best way' typology was con-
structed as a recipe for the design of production under other economic, 
social and political conditions (Smith 1989). 
In the American debate on Japan we can identify a similar process. 
American writers interpreting Japanese patterns of organisation identified 
standards, practices and methods which were transferable to the West as 
neutral organisational innovations (Vogel 1979; Ouchi 1981; Pascale and 
Athos 1981). In the recent wave of writing on Japanese foreign direct 
investment in the U.S., the manufacture of universal concepts, such as 'lean 
production' (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990) or 'innovation-mediated 
production' (Kenney and Florida 1993) follows a similar pattern of 
constructing neutral organisational paradigms. 
Womack et al. (1990: 242) are explicitly concerned with the diffusion of 
what they consider to be a new production paradigm, which they claim is 
not equal to Japanese production. It just so happens that everything about 
'lean production' is taken from the Japanese experience. They say it 
developed at Toyota and then spread to other Japanese companies at home 
and in the United States; they consider themselves pilgrims spreading 
the gospel of 'lean production' and, as such, their analysis follows the 
well-trodden paths of Taylor and others in the American tradition of 
promulgating universal rational prescriptions for regulating work. This 
disconnecting of 'lean production' from the institutional supports and 
context of Japanese society has been criticised by Abo (1994: 286) and 
others. Within their model there is no room for national adaptation, local 
variation or alternatives to 'lean production'. As Berggren (1992: 17) has 
noted, their 'prescription' is that 'the West must adopt the Japanese 
production system lock, stock and barrel and [they] explicitly warn against 
any attempts at modification'. As with their account of the diffusion of 
'fordism' to Europe, the idea of local adaptation or innovation, or national 
variation, is considered a dilution or weakening of the integrity of the 
universal practice. For example, they explicitly dismiss the 'British system 
of mass production' (Womack et al. 1990: 235) as a feeble alternative to 
'fordism', a result of the poorly-educated managers, unstable domestic 
demand, adversarial labour relations and the persistence of piece-work. 
Kenney and Florida have written explicitly against culturalism and in 
favour of contingency theories of organisational diffusion in relation to the 
Japan debate (Florida and Kenney 1991). They initially attempted to 
capture the nature of the Japanese production system through the term 
'Fujitsuism' - derived from Japan's largest computer company (and deve-
loped to emphasise variance from autos and Toyotism), the sector and 
company taken as symbols of Japanese practices (Kenney and Florida 
1988). More recently, they moved towards more universalistic organisa-
tional terminology with their concept of 'innovation-mediated production' 
(IMP) - the tight integration of R & D and production (Kenney and Florida 
1993). They, like Womack et al. claim that their production paradigm 'should 
not be considered synonymous with the Japanese model' (Kenny and 
Florida 1993: 14), but again, is it coincidental that 'Japan- more than any 
other nation - has been able to institutionalize and generalize the new model 
at the very core of its industrial structure' (15). To be fair, they suggest that 
specific variants of IMP will inevitably occur, for the same happened with 
'fordism', but such variants are from a typology almost exclusively informed 
by the Japanese model and they therefore will look like deviations from a 
fixed norm, rather than genuine alternatives (Smith 1994). 
In short, American writers struggling to interpret the rise of Japanese 
competition and manufacturing decline in the American economy, have 
used comparative analysis to abstract organisational standards which can 
then be applied as techniques and typologies free from cultural or national 
contamination. There has been a pervasive attempt to construct universal 
models, even where, as in the debate over Japanese transplanted companies, 
these models are synonymous with or reliant upon a single dominant 
economy. This has been in contrast to the European debate, where there has 
been more stress on adaptation and diversity in production systems. 
European Writing 
The German debate on the 'end of the division oflabour' or 'post-Taylorist' 
interpretations of Japan has shown less inclination to construct new 
paradigms, and has paid more attention to 'selection' and 'adaptation' of the 
lessons of Japan Gurgens 1989). Moreover, there has been a persistent 
critique of the Japanese system as one based on labour compliance and 
submission, which has only transferred to the West due to 'tremendous 
pressure of labour-market conditions and individual fear of job loss', not 
because of 'superior' efficiency standards Gurgens 1989: 218). 
Kern and Schumann's (1984) vision of the post-Taylorist future stresses 
its contradictory and polarising character - between highly-skilled and 
marginal groups - and, despite a spirited scenario for the future, they have 
not generated any unconditionally optimistic prescriptions. Within German 
industrial sociology there has been a fierce debate around this very limited 
post-Taylorist vision, with most authors supporting, as in the French 
debate, neo-Taylorist or neo-fordist perspectives which emphasise con-
tinuity rather than any radical departure from mass production (Smith 
1989). Concepts such as 'systematic rationalisation', for example, deve-
loped by the ISF (Institute for Social Science Research) group in Munich, 
explicitly link labour process restructuring with capitalist control concerns 
and reject a 'paradigmatic change in rationalisation strategy' towards what 
Kern and Schumann see as a 'requalification' or 'reprofessionalisation' of 
industrial work (Sauer et al. 1992: 52). Kern and Schumann themselves 
(1993: 102) in a recent paper appear less optimistic and support the ISF 
group in recognising the pervasive and comprehensive rationalisation taking 
place in industry, affecting not just production and personnel, but 
purchasing, planning, marketing and the location and the integration of 
firms. Moreover, through new research they show the further polarisation 
between high-tech post-Taylorist labour processes and low-tech Taylorist 
ones. In a recent volume, Altmann et al. (1992) reveals the nationally 
specific nature of the German debate, and the reluctance to develop 
over-arching models which are not tied to national institutions and prac-
tice, (that is, a societal context). 
This is not to say that European writers dealing with the same concerns 
have not tried to generate universal models. More explicitly engaging with 
the Japanese model and its mediations through U.S. discourse, Berggren 
(1992) has argued for a 'synthesis' between aspects of the Japanese and 
Swedish practices - what he calls 'post-lean human-centred production'. 
Like German critics, he rejects the labour intensification of the Japanese 
system in favour of the humanisation programmes characteristic of some 
firms in Sweden; but, theoretically, he shows that the transformation of 
Japanese practices into a 'model' prevents evolution and development, and 
creates a fetish for practices -]IT, space economy - which are in fact 
disappearing in Japan. 'Lean production' is 'out of sync with the current 
debate in Japan and, compared to Western [Swedish] "best practice", 
presents a regression in terms of working conditions as well as individual 
freedom' (Berggren 1992: 17, 253). 
Again, there is a stress on critical adaptation, selection and interaction 
between practices and national traditions: pluralism, rather than 'one best 
way'. At the same time, Sweden - because of unique conditions - has 
pioneered alternative social relations at work, which are potentially opera-
tional elsewhere, although the contractions between Sweden as unique 
instance and as 'model' are not resolved by Berggren. His 'post-lean 
human-centred production' system is rather half-hearted, as he seems to be 
more aware of the limitations ofthe model than its ability to be generalised 
beyond Sweden. Moreover, the closure of the most radically anti-fordist 
Volvo plant at Uddevalla, and likely closure of the Kalmar factory, remind 
us that the Swedish experience is limited to a particular historical period 
rather than being structurally embedded within the society. Volvo's links 
with Renault appeared to strengthen the hand of those seeking the 
re-introduction of more conventional assembly-line production, bringing 
Swedish job reforms into line with European standards, rather than any 
movement the other way (Thompson and Sederblad 1994). 
British academics have not evolved new models, or attempted to push 
'British practice' as a 'new panacea'. The reasons for this are not hard to 
fmd: British manufacturing continues to shrink, while foreign multi-
nationals increase their presence and Britain's share of world trade declines 
further. The experience in the U.K. has been rather one of critical engage-
ment with prescriptions from the U.S. (see, for example, the generally 
hostile attitudes towards flexibility, 'flexible specialisation' and 'new pro-
duction concepts' in Pollert 1991 and Blyton and Morris 1992). Debate on 
Japanese management has tended to retain the national prefix as 'Japanis-
ation', suggesting diffusion, due to the creation of functionally equivalent 
institutional and economic supports in Britain for the compliance oflabour 
in Japan (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992). However, such a prognosis has also 
been severely criticised (see Elger and Smith 1994 for a review). In general, 
the stress on the diversity of production, retention rather than the end of 
mass production and 'fordist' principles has dominated British debate, 
reflecting perhaps the diversity of British industrial structures, the high level 
of inward-investment of 'screw-driver' or simple assembly factories, national 
hostility to neat typologies and prescriptions, and the role of misplaced 
national pride in denying economic decline. 
There have, therefore, been different responses to the debate on 'post-
Taylorism/post-Fordism' and reaction to Japan in Europe and the U.S. Our 
review indicates that there are clear tensions between attempts to generate 
over-arching, systemic typologies, typical of U.S. writers, and more cautious 
stress on diversity, pluralism, selection and adaptation, more typical of 
European writers. In none of these texts is anything like a coherent 
cross-national comparative theory developed: rather, tensions between 
national and universal systems and approaches are produced. 
From 'societal effects' to national models 
In the 'new production concepts' debate some versions have moved from 
national (U.S. and Japan) models to universal paradigms. At the other end 
of the debate on cross-national difference is the institutional or 'societal 
effects' school, which has recently travelled from a stress on national 
diversity to the construction of national 'models'. What do we mean by this? 
Initially the work of what Rose (1985) has called the 'Aix Group' of 
cross-national researchers suggested that each society was unique, to the 
extent that organisational or economic constraints could not reduce the 
specific character of social relations or organisations in different countries. 
There were no imperatives capable of eliminating national differences. Their 
analysis permitted precise and substantive findings on the cultural 
difference in business organisations between societies. 'By means of cross-
national comparisons of organizational units which were fairly identical with 
regard to acknowledged contingencies, this Group has identified quite a 
large cross-national variety of organizational forms and practices which 
though unrelated to task context or performance difference, is very closely 
bound to institutionalized human resources (education, training, work 
careers), social stratification and industrial relations' (Sorge 1991: 162). 
Despite such a commitment to national organisational pluralism, there 
has been a tension between nationally distinct and nationally superior 
methods of organising. While insisting on the functional equivalence of 
societal patterns in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, Rose (1985: 80) 
pointed to a contradiction in the work of the 'Aix Group' between the 
societal effects on organisations and more universal forces, ideas and 
practices derived from shared economic systems or new technological 
developments. For example, examining the utilisation of information 
technology across capitalist societies Rose quotes Maurice as saying that 
while 'different forms of the division oflabour may lead to comparable levels 
of efficiency, it is none the less true that certain systems seem more efficient 
than others' (emphasis added). This seems to imply a 'one best way' 
approach, as, evidently, 'industrial relationships structured primarily in 
terms of competence based on polyvalent training and a spirit of profes-
sionality on the German 'model' should permit adaptation much more 
readily than others. Does this not suggest that pressures will arise in 
societies with very dissimilar industrial relationships to indulge in institu-
tional borrowing?' But Rose (80) adds the rider that so far the 'Aix team 
have been reluctant to engage in any such conjectures'. 
In the work of British supporters of the 'societal effect' approach (Child 
1981; Lane 1989) there has also been an ambivalent attitude towards the 
degree of equality between national institutional arrangements and a strong 
tendency to elevate all things German to a superior position. In other words, 
some societies are clearly turned into models from which other societies can 
learn. There is a tension between seeing a plurality of national recipes for 
work organisation, all equally effective, and a hierarchy of national 
efficiency, with some societies 'better' than others at organising the firm. 
National recipes are being constantly measured against each other in terms 
of efficiency, and this creates pressures towards standardisation. This 
material reality in turn produces the need for a more dynamic and 
integrative analysis. Child and Lane, while emphasising the centrality of the 
nation state for structuring work organisation, do seek, in both explicit and 
implicit ways, to rank societies by non-cultural or structural criteria of 
efficiency. Indeed, one of the purposes of comparative analysis in British 
hands seems to be to find other societal patterns and practices from which 
Britain can borrow, learn, modernise and revitalise 'its' fortunes. 
The Unresolved Problem: Between Diversity and Standard Models 
The interest in borrowing and cross-national learning in comparative 
organisational analysis represents a significant advance on what came 
before. However, far from resolving the traditional ambivalence regarding 
the convergence/divergence problem, it has reproduced it at a more 
complex level of analysis. Even attempts to synthesise the various 
approaches reflect this continued theoretical problem. 
Child (1981), for example, offered a synthesis in his 'culture, capitalism 
and contingency' perspective, which argued that cross-national studies 
needed to address cultural and institutional reproduction of diversity, 
common social relations given by political economy and pressures and 
constraints imposed by contingencies such as technology, scale and market. 
Lane (1989) applied this perspective in an evaluation of labour and 
management practices and relations in Britain, Germany and France. The 
problem with these kinds of study is that one society appears to come to 
embody the 'best practice' standards against which others are judged. The 
theory, however, cannot explain why this should be the case. 
Another synthetic model is the idea of the national 'business system' 
(Whitley 1992a, 1992b). This argues that national economies are shaped by 
social and economic institutions which can be quite specific to particular 
societies and regions; and that, despite pressures for internationalisation 
and regionalisation from economic and political co-ordination and control 
created by TNCs and the EU or other regional forces, national specificity 
continues to be reproduced. This theory borrows heavily from the societal 
effects school, while attempting to integrate the forces of internationalisa-
tion as they impact on firms, sectors and social institutions. While, for the 
societal effects school, each society is irreducible to external exigencies, 
business systems writers recognise more complex patterns of interaction, 
with dominant economies and more internationalised economic sectors -
such as oil, autos, electricals - able to create non-national or regional 
patterns of business organisations. One problem with the approach is that 
externalities within the environment are considered to shape the organisa-
tion, and social action within the firm or the labour process is ignored. 
Auto studies from MIT and the Wissenschaftszentrum expose differences 
between national mass production systems, holding constant industrial 
sector, and demonstrate the need to link different levels of analysis in 
comparative studies -the sector, dominant trends or dynamics (whether 
there is movement away from mass or fordist production) alongside 
company differences and national institutional settlements and contexts 
Gurgens, Maisch and Dohse 1993; Jurgens 1993). Indeed, this method of 
cross-national comparison is superior to the usual two or three country 
comparisons between shared sectors, such as Gallie's (1977; 1979) work on 
the French and British oil refineries, Dore's (1973) work on British and 
Japanese electrical companies and the various Aix Group sector studies of 
institutional diversities in Germany, France and Britain. This is because it 
theorises and examines, especially in German writing, the multi-national 
firm and the idea of new production paradigms and not simply the national 
arena of production. However, as our earlier discussion of 'new production 
concepts' reveals, there is a strong inclination to elevate one society (the 
U.S., Japan) or company (Ford, Toyota) into the position of standard-
maker against which other societies or companies are judged and measured. 
This reflects a tendency to reproduce 'one best way' thinking, without 
showing how this can be integrated with patterns of organisational national 
diversity. Following a painstaking dissection of the specificities of work 
organisation within car companies in different countries, Jurgens (1993: 
122) nevertheless concludes by suggesting the future lies with two country 
models, the Japanese or German, or 'a synthesis of the Japanese and 
German models; group formation, job integration, and extreme work 
efficiency in manual mass production according to the Japanese example; 
skilled-worker oriented team formation and professionalisation in the high 
technology areas and in the service functions according to the German 
model'. While these societies form the extreme benchmarks for work 
organisation, they should not be transposed into paradigms which discount 
national diversity and specificity. 
Although each of the new approaches has strengths and weakness, it is 
apparent that none develops an adequate theorisation of the international 
determinants of national organisational forms of work. While the inter-
national dimension has been acknowledged as a result of the contemporary 
discussion of borrowing, best practice and new production concepts, this 
has raised more questions than it has answered: 
Is it legitimate to convert some nations into 'models', as in the 'Japanese 
model', the 'German model', 'Swedish model'? This occurs both ex-
plicitly, as in the American version of the 'new production concepts' 
debate, and implicitly, as in the tendency to elevate German practices as 
standards, in the work of the 'Aix Group',Jurgens et al., Child and Lane. 
By constructing these 'models', history is closed. 
Can nations be judged as equals? This is especially so in the 'Aix 
Group', in their idea of functional equivalent ways of organising within 
nation states, rather than ranking efficiency differences. The clear eco-
nomic differences between nation states means a hierarchy of efficiency 
is constantly being reproduced. 
What are the circumstances which promote learning? What are the 
limits, if any, on the transmission of organisational practice across 
national boundaries? And what role do trans-national agencies, such as 
TNCs, play in the creation and reproduction of work cultures from one 
society to the next? 
We need an integrative model of cross-national differences, which is both 
able to explain why convergence pressures co-exist with those promoting 
diversity, at the same time as separating the precise influence these different 
forces have. We need a theory which explains why some societies play the 
role as standard-makers, which is clearly evident in the way the U.S. and 
Japan are considered, at the same time as recognising the limitations on one 
society adopting the standards generated in another. This is what we 
propose below. 
An Alternative Approach 
The main determinants of organisational forms and practice have been 
identified in the existing literature on comparative organisations as: the 
underlying political economy, which has a country and increasingly inter-
national dimension; national social institutions; and global standards and 
practices (in the form of imported 'best practice'). Our approach to 
cross-national organisational analysis begins with much the same lists of 
determinants. However, we seek to integrate them more explicitly and to 
theorise more adequately the role of global forces. To be more specific, our 
approach differs from existing approaches in two principal ways: 
(i) We reject the inherent dualism of most contemporary approaches, in 
which the economy is treated as an ahistorical 'structure' existing in tension 
with historical national institutions. Instead, we argue that the two must be 
seen as inextricably linked aspects of actual national histories. Thus, 
economic forces do not predetermine how actual societies will look. Rather, 
they create pressures, problems and exigencies which must be 'worked out' 
in actual societies. National institutions, thus, are not simply 'obstacles' to 
the expansion of these underlying forces. They are, in addition, responses to 
these pressures; they both condition and are conditioned by them. In this 
sense, one could refer to our approach as a structural contingency approach 
to work in organisations. 
(ii) We reject the tendency to reduce global forces to the act of 'borrow-
ing' or 'emulating' best practice developed elsewhere. Instead, we contend 
that the international economy must be understood as a complex, deeply 
integrated system. The way in which individual societies are integrated into 
the system, the history of their relationship to it and the dynamics of the 
system as a whole help to explain both why 'best practice' occasionally 
appear and become candidates for borrowing, and why such borrowing has 
not and is unlikely to result in simple convergence. 
System Effects 
A political economic system, such as capitalism, feudalism or state social-
ism, contains distinct social relations and forces which impose themselves 
upon a country's organisations as a disciplinary mechanism. The role of 
markets for co-ordination, the employment relation, the capitalist labour 
process, the application of science and technology to production, mana-
gerial hierarchies and so forth are relations and practices common to 
capitalism as a system. However, these common elements take different 
forms: trade unions, for example, exist as interest groups created by waged 
labour, but can be organised along occupational, industrial and enterprise 
lines, with differing political affiliations and identities, such that similarity of 
function does not, in itself, determine the action of trade unions outside of 
particular societal contexts. 
The word 'system' implies something fixed or automatic, but it is not used 
here in that way. This is because all 'modes of production' are social 
constructions, and therefore subject to human history, and the historical 
process is never fixed or definite. The mode of production suggests an 
agenda, sets limits on what may occur, but it cannot predetermine the 
outcome or precise history of these conflicts. A mode of production can take 
different 'forms' over different historical epochs (for example, personal, 
financial and managerial capitalism) but its dynamic social relations, such 
as conflict between labour and capital, remain the same. While a mode of 
production sets certain parameters or constraints on organisational choice, 
it does not, impose standardised behaviour - 'one best way', or 'universal 
management principles' or identical institutions for managing conflict and 
contradiction. 
We can also think of 'systems' as possessing inclusive features, as in 
the 'class system', 'innovation system' or 'sex-gender system' or, at the 
organisational level, the 'socio-technical system' of contingency theory. 
Industrial sectors can be considered as distinct economic sub-systems, with 
their own identities, histories and interests (Smith, Child and Rawlinson 
1990). Firms can also be seen in systemic terms, the multi-national as a 
distinct form of business organisation, or the multi-divisional company. A 
recent book on national 'innovation systems' sought to balance the extent 
to which technology remained influenced by national political policies, 
economies and sectors, and how far it had been 'internationalised' along 
global lines, as 'technological communities have become transnational as 
never before' (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993: 17). Some sectors exhibited a 
more transnational character, such as oil, while others, even where they are 
internationalised, exhibit marked national differences in organisation, as in 
the differing structures of the U.S. French and Japanese semi-conductor 
industries (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993: 18). 
Systemic thinking therefore tends to generalise across cultural or national 
boundaries. 'The internationalization ofbusiness and technology erodes the 
extent to which national borders and citizenship define boundaries that are 
meaningful in analyzing technological capabilities and technical advance' 
(Nelson and Rosenberg 1993: 17). In itself, such theorising only repeats the 
problems already discussed in other universal paradigms. However, 
systemic thinking remains a necessary part of any attempt to understand 
work organisation or capital-labour relations within any parti- cular society; 
but system thinking requires national contexts, and these mediate and 
condition systemic dynamics of whatever type. 
Societal Effects 
Remaining at the macro-level of political economy we can say there are a 
variety of societal contexts through which 'modes of production' emerge, 
develop and get reproduced. It is a level of institutionalisation which 
encultures systemic forces with unique qualities. Structural relationships 
characteristic of capitalism or feudalism can only emanate and evolve within 
actual societies, most of which possess long histories and pre- existing 
institutional arrangements, and therefore create unique intimations to 
systemic dynamics of each society. 
Institutionalists of the 'Aix Group' and many other social scientists, have, 
as discussed earlier, emphasised the importance of 'nations' for mediating 
general forces, such as those produced by capitalism. We could be more 
specific, and say that the state and the institutions of civil society have 
differentially influenced both the emergence and subsequent reproduction 
of'capital' within particular territories. This interaction, according to Sorge 
(1991) and 'Aix Group' theorists, does not create conformity, as the 
globalising effect which may flow from these capitalist dynamics can only 
ever fit into the existing divergence of national recipes, and therefore 
perpetuate 'non-identical reproduction of existing specificity' .1 Another way 
of saying the same thing, is that internationalisation of capital builds on the 
competitive advantages of different countries rather than homo- genising 
them. While we see problems with this line of analysis, leading as it does 
towards an ultimate denial of the dynamic forces of international capitalism, 
we nevertheless recognise the 'societal effects' on capital-labour relations 
within the firm. Indeed, it is obvious from any cursory historical assessment 
of the nature of work and social relations within societies sharing the same 
mode of production, that marked differences persist. 
Legacies can be built into any new system from what came before. Gallie 
(1983: 206-215) has discussed this as the 'Mann/Giddens' explanation of 
radicalism amongst French workers. Trotsky (1967: 22-31) used this as an 
explanation for the revolutionary consciousness of Russian workers. Fox 
(1985) has examined pre-capitalist forms of market individualism in 
English commercial agriculture and its influence on the subsequent charac-
ter of British capitalism, with its strong emphasis on market contractualism 
and weak state collectivism. Meiksins Wood (1991) in a recent 'historical 
essay on old regimes and modem states' has highlighted the diverse 
historical experience of capitalism. Only in England were feudal property 
relations transformed into capitalist ones; while, in most European states, 
feudalism was superseded not by capitalism, but absolutism (as was the case 
in Germany) and city states (as in Italy). This in turn affected the nature of 
capitalist development in these countries. We do not dwell on these issues, 
but stress the pertinence of diversity of routes and continuities between old 
and new systems against earlier theories of the sweeping away of the past 
through industrialisation. 
The character of national institutions and work organisation can be 
strongly shaped by the past. The ancien regime might even facilitate, rather 
than hinder, the growth of the new regime. Meiksins Wood (1991: 16) notes 
how the 'survival of archaic forms can promote, rather than impede, 
capitalist development - for instance, the availability of bureaucratic state-
forms whose interventions can override the inherent contradictions of'pure' 
capitalism, or the persistence of cultural forms that underwrite the 
deference of workers'. In this way, capitalism as a economic system is 
compatible with a variety of political regimes, despite having certain 
'democratic' elements (173). In any case, the implication of our own view 
of the interaction of 'system effects' and 'societal effects' is that societies are 
in a constant state of tension between convergence and divergence. There is 
no natural tendency for this tension to be resolved ultimately in favour of 
one or the other dynamic. Rather, it is an inherent feature of the historical 
process for both dynamics to operate simultaneously within actual societies. 
The structural pressures set up by the underlying political economy are real: 
however, they are expressed through and conditioned by national histories, 
so that simple convergence is an unlikely outcome. 
Dominance Effects 
It is clear from the history of capitalism that there has always been a 
hierarchy between economies, and those in dominant positions have 
frequently evolved methods of organising production or the division of 
labour which have invited emulation and interest. These 'dominant' socie-
ties are deemed to represent 'modernity' or the future, and act, either in 
total or through aspects of their system, as a measure of 'progress' and 
'development'. Acknowledging this hierarchy between countries compli-
cates the processes of convergence and divergence associated with what we 
have identified as system and society effects. 
The idea of 'best practice' and borrowing between societies seems 
common to the history of methods of organising work, but has accelerated 
with the increasing integration of economic activity. This process needs to 
be placed within a larger context if we are to answer such questions as why 
some countries, but not others, act as benchmarks for general efficiency. 
Moreover, how the techniques and practices exported from these particular 
countries interact with national institutional arrangements, and what 
hastens and impedes their diffusion, also requires further investigation. 
We can refine this idea of dominance by examining the conditions 
creating best practice. Clearly economic performance against other socie-
ties qualifies a country receiving special attention, and through its operation 
in the international economy facilitates the diffusion of its practices to other 
societies. A dominant society's economic strengths may be in industries 
which are prone to internationalised production - such as mass production 
goods. It is not surprising that mass production industries such as autos and 
electricals have dominated typologies of 'best practice' for manu- facturing. 
These sectors are more internationalised, and have therefore acted as 
transfer mechanisms for global standards - whether as Fordism, Toyotism, 
Fujitsuism, 'lean production' or whole nation standards such as in the idea 
of 'Japanisation'. The U.S. and Japanese economies are power- fully placed 
in these sectors, and it has been through them that notions of 'best practice' 
have developed and become generalised. 
Dominance is mediated by the timing of a country's entry into inter-
national capitalism, as conditions in the system differ over time and these in 
turn select some country or strategy of industrialisation, while rejecting 
others. Timing can be examined in several ways. Firstly, by discussing the 
'niches' available for countries to enter. While industrialisation has a 
developmental sequence by sector - countries move from labour-intensive 
to technology and capital-intensive industries - these also change, as the 
international division of labour and growth of export processing zones 
affects low-tech sectors such as clothing and textiles (Dicken 1992). 
Secondly, 'later' industrialisers, if they are to 'catch-up' with countries 
already in the race, have usually not only to learn existing methods of 
production, but to improve upon them. It is wrong to assume, as industrial 
society theory does or recent advocates of new production paradigms do, 
that there is only one, modern, advanced form of production to emulate -
a simple catch-up view of industrialisation. For, as Dore (1973) and 
others have shown, lateness allows for combined and uneven development, 
strategic alliances, the skipping of stages, installation and modification 
of dominant systems, and greater state or strategic direction to work 
organisation. Late industrialisers, if they are to enter world markets as 
autonomous players, cannot rely on small-scale, decentralised change 
agencies because the point on the scale of capitalist development they are 
entering does not permit this. Instead of small entrepreneurs, collective 
forces such as states, large-firm/state blocs, or international institutions 
are more likely to direct change. Dore (1973) noted how late indus-
trialisers, such as Japan, created institutions of formal education which 
segmented and disciplined the labour force prior to industrialisation; how 
giant firms structured formal education and training institutions to suit 
their needs; and how organisations took precedence over market methods 
of regulation. Economic nationalism and a greater role for the state are also 
apparent. 
A simple early-late dichotomy, of itself, is not helpful as, after Britain, all 
societies were 'late' industrialisers; and discussing 'degrees' of lateness 
cannot be sufficiently discriminating to be analytically meaningful. Is a very 
late industrialiser different from a not-so-late one? However, the develop-
mental aspect of industrialisation at an international level does present 
structural constraints for societies. In particular, the mechanisms of indus-
trialisation and diffusion of 'best practice' are affected by timing. In the 
twentieth century, especially the latter part, trans-national corporations 
have played an active role in transferring 'best practice' between countries. 
It was within TNCs that Japanese methods transferred to the U.S. and 
Britain, although not in a straightforward way (Kenney and Florida 1993; 
Elger and Smith 1994). The American firm of McKinsey & Co. were 
responsible for reorganising managerial structures and the divisionalisation 
(M-form) of over half of the top one hundred companies in Britain in the 
1960s (Chandler 1990: 615). However, again there may be adaptation of 
the M-form to British conditions, and not a replica of one 'best practice' 
(Kogut and Parkinson 1993: 191).Uttler (1982) has highlighted the role of 
international consultancies and multi-national companies in helping to 
diffuse versions ofTaylorism into Britain in the 1920s and 1930s- see also 
Kogut and Parkinson (1993) - and Stopford and Turner (1985) have 
discussed the way U.S. management and personnel practices were diffused 
to Britain by American subsidiaries ofTNCs. 
Countries can be slotted into commodity chains relative to societal 
endowments, and have their comparative superiority and inferiority re-
inforced. Although, as a recent paper on changes in the hierarchy of 
production chains between Japanese-owned American and Mexican elec-
trical assembly factories makes clear, relations along production chains are 
dynamic 'constantly evolving spatial divisions of labor' and not fixed by a 
country's institutional competitive advantages (Kenney and Florida 1994: 
38). The international division of labour, while facilitating the diffusion of 
practices, also puts limits on them. Moreover, not all developing countries 
can be like South Korea or Taiwan, for example, as these export-oriented 
industrialisers have been marked by dominance - as colonies of Japan, and 
cold-war sites of super-power struggles - which makes them relatively 
unique (Corbridge 1985). Aside from the way they integrate into the 
international economy and their societal histories, we could also say that 
their success limits their utility - dozens of Koreas would create severe 
dislocation in free trade, as even the limited penetration of the U.S. market 
by these newly industrialised countries has caused tariffs to be imposed on 
their exports, which has forced internationalisation of production of Asian 
fashion clothing companies to central America (within open access of the 
U.S. market) and directly into developed countries (McDermott 1992; Belo 
and Rosenfield 1992). 
Dominance effects complicate our understanding of the diversity of work 
organisation: either as model or force, the ability of a dominant power to 
command is, in the end, limited by the structural forces shaping global 
capitalism. The effects of combined and uneven development means that 
the role of 'dominant' state, sector or company as standard-maker rotates 
between societies. 'Best practices' therefore become infused with the 
cultural contingencies of each new dominant state, which in turn compli-
cates convergence pressures. Emphasising the national origins of 'best 
practices' - as in examples of Americanisation, Japanisation or 
Germanisation, - can be used to block their application in other countries. 
The export of British practices to the U.S., Australia or other countries was 
ultimately linked to and limited by the place of Britain within the pecking 
order of capitalist countries. If we take the example of the social production 
of engineers, then the Canadian case illustrates this process. Initially 
Canadian engineers were produced along British lines, with apprentice-
ships and an elite professional association. Britain, through colonial in-
fluence and world economic power, provided both model and external force 
in Canada. However, Canadian industrialisation was late and came under 
the influence of American 'best practice' which, in the formation of 
engineers, meant university training and partial credentialism. British 
practice no-longer articulated with the industrial realities of the type of 
capitalism Canada was entering. In other words, Britain's colonial influence 
offered a model of engineering organisation, but this proved incongruent 
with the prevailing conditions of industrial capitalism Canada was entering, 
and as such, Canadian practice was modelled more on its rising dominant 
southern neighbour (Millward 1988; Smith, 1990). 
In conclusion then, we are saying that 'best practice' is part of a larger 
reality, and that it is the international economic system which ultimately 
structures the constitution of what is best practice and shapes patterns of its 
diffusion. This system has both convergence and divergence dynamics. Thus 
it does create pressures to diffuse best practice, but competition between 
dominant countries means there is never a single model of this, and uneven 
development ensures that there is a turnover in practices. Moreover the 
international division oflabour, and increasing integration of production on 
a global scale, means countries must differ from each other in certain ways; 
this acts against the global adoption of dominant standards and, hence, 
convergence. 
How Deep do 'Best Practices' Go? 
Several doubts can be raised against giving prominence to the role of best 
practice in shaping work organisation. First, it could be argued that such 
borrowing is superficial, affecting only the firm level and not the institu-
tional arrangements of the state or civil society. Second, it might be that 
whatever is witnessed in other societies by 'significant' actors - corporate 
managers, civil servants or others - cannot simply be imposed in their 'own' 
society or firm, due to the commitment to or embeddedness of existing 
practices. Thirdly, it might be that any new standard will inevitably become 
diluted or adapted by host institutions and agencies, producing 
a multiplicity of national versions of ostensible 'best practices' such,_ as 
Taylorism, Fordism, M-form or ]IT. As such, we would be back to 
institutional cultural pluralism, and not universal ways of organising. 
In reply to these objections we would accept that the workplace, especially 
the manufacturing workplace, has been the target for 'best practice', and 
shaping the wider institutional nature of a society with such state 
programmes as, say, corporatism or privatisation, is more problematic. Yet. 
while recognising that international benchmarks affect all levels, it is 
obviously the case that recasting institutional systems is more complex than 
adjusting factory regimes. As such, the factory or organisational levels may 
be more dynamic and variable, relative to social institutions of the state and 
civil society. On the second question, our argument takes on the central 
issue of transmission and implementation, and acknowledges that inter-
national standards are separate from the manner of their execution, which 
can only be explored empirically and not a priori. The question of agency at 
social institution and organisational level is clearly central to the issue of 
transfer and borrowing, and the firm may be more dynamic, subject to more 
central direction and therefore able to more quickly absorb best practices, 
relative to social institutions, but this clearly depends on the strength of the 
new relative to existing practices. Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) mention the 
selective transfer of 'bits of JIT' into U.K. manu- facturing firms emulating 
Japanese practices. 
On the related third objection we also recognise how mediation creates 
adaptations and variation, and it is central to our argument that com-
parative cross-national research should explore interaction between the 
three levels, and not the superiority of one over the other. Abo (1994), 
discussing the transfer of Japanese production and management practices 
into the U.S., speaks of the 'application-adaptation dilemma' to reinforce 
the fact that Japanese practices remain attached to Japanese social institu-
tions and social relations, and cannot be readily decontextualised and 
applied to a different social and economic context, but rather need 
adaptation, which can dilute their competitive advantage (hence the 
dilemma of transfer for Japanese companies) and create 'hybrid' factory 
regimes. We would also add that Japanese firms are more likely to actively 
sponsor the partial transfer of practices along their global commodity chain 
and, therefore, strategically position practices to suit local labour markets, 
product markets and so on (Elger and Smith 1994). In other words, the firm 
may more strategically interact and shape host environments, as well as be 
subject to the pressures to conform to conditions within particular 
countries. As Abo (1994: 16) notes, 'if the Japanese production system does 
establish a clear superiority over other systems, then within certain para-
meters, it will spread to other countries. However the degree to which it 
permeates a given society will be governed by conditions in that society'. 
We can explore this interaction through an example, the construction and 
diffusion of Taylorism. It developed as a reaction to the dominance of 
British capital, against British craft practices, within a high wage immigrant 
economy, with mass markets and a particular system of standardised 
American manufacture (Merkel 1980; Nelson 1975; Montgomery 1979; 
Clark 1987). Despite these special conditions, Taylorism, once developed, 
was promoted as a universal ('scientific management'), not distinctively 
American, way of organising. In its diffusion, however, its origins continued 
to be used as a reason to limit its value: British engineers and managers 
resisted it as inappropriate for Britain, and it was viewed as an 'American' 
system (Littler 1982; Kogut and Parkinson 1993). It was not until the 
extension ofU.S. mass production technology, growth in the size of markets 
and spread of U.S. corporations that Taylorism migrated beyond America 
(Littler 1982): Europe had to 'catch-up' with American economic 
conditions. With the passage of time, the competitive advantage of the 
methods and the creation of a layer of diffusion agents - industrial engin-
eers, management academics, consultants - Taylorism lost its national 
status and entered textbooks as a universal practice. This was because it was 
not simply an American capitalist ideology - a cultural contingent - but a 
way of organising from a dominant state, hence one tied to capitalist 
advance, and by capitals with the power to intemationalise, diffuse and 
impose their 'solutions' on other nations. There is always an inter-meshing 
and contradiction between society, system and dominance elements within 
these 'best practices', but the ascendancy of the different levels varies 
according to period and location. Understanding this interaction is central 
to comparative analysis, and we will discuss this in our conclusion. 
Conclusion: Between System, Society and Dominance 
An economic system, such as capitalism, provides both a common and, at 
the same time, special experience for workers and managers, diversity being 
produced by its mode of arrival, timing and structural configuration within 
particular nations. Societies contain patterns and structures which have an 
embedded distinctiveness and observable effects on the organisation of 
work and management. Societies, however, cannot reproduce uniqueness 
unconstrained by the general forces of capital accumulation and globalis-
ation, or what we have identified as competitive pressures created by the 
efficiency standards or 'best practices' of dominant states. In other words, 
the three broad levels of influence derived from society, system and 
dominance effects interact within the social relations of the firm. 
System effects create the internal dynamics and problems to which 
managers and workers respond. They offer recurrent themes characteristic 
of capitalist society, and structure the crises that affect which is to be the 
dominant economic power. Society effects create the context (institutional 
and cultural) within which the system problems are solved or tackled. 
Society effects are also conditioned in important ways by the articulation of 
the system, for example, when and how a country became capitalist. 
Dominance effects may override or combine with local culture to reshape 
institutions. They may present new solutions to system problems, for 
example fresh ways of organising assembly lines, the division of labour or 
relationship between manual and mental labour. Dominance, in turn, is 
conditioned by the system - by the tendency for ongoing re-alignment of 
economic powers within global capitalism. Also, the extent to which, and 
the manner in which, innovations are transferred depends on the nature of 
the relationships between transferor and transferee, that is, on their relative 
positions in the global system. The system establishes which problems need 
to be solved through borrowing - no agency is attracted to an innovation 
that doesn't address a real problem. The key point, then, is that all three 
levels are linked: it is not a matter of either/or. Moreover, the levels are 
unstable and mobile, structured by internal contradictions and dynamics. 
When making comparisons between societies in, for example, the utilis-
ation of new technology, organisation of work, structure of industrial 
relations procedures or management styles, we should be aware of the 
inherent tendency to freeze social action within the discourse of national 
differences. This is especially true when examining 'factory regimes'-
management and labour process organisation at firm level - because this 
level, as opposed to institutions of the state or public sector, is particularly 
dynamic and variegated. This may be all the greater in those countries where 
the autonomy of the firm from the state (but not the capital markets) is 
more pronounced, as in the U.S. and Great Britain. As Whitley (1994: 120) 
has noted, firms from 'economies with more pluralist or fragmented 
institutional arrangements, whose ownership and acnvtnes are spread 
between a variety of differently organised economies, are more likely to 
develop nationally 'deviant' qualities as a result of operating in different 
contexts'. Whereas firms from strongly integrated and successful economies 
may carry over national character to subsidiaries when locating abroad, 
and transfer home country practices rather than adopt the practices 
encountered in the host economy. 
The character of the host economy and its relative openness or receptive-
ness to dominant 'best practice' varies historically as well as structurally. The 
heterogeneous 'factory regimes' in Britain, with its concentration of 
multi-national companies and generally more cosmopolitan economic 
structure, is evidence of the weakness of state regulation of capital and 
increased constraints upon labour during the last decade. This has had its 
effect. For example, whereas the timing of American companies' arrival in 
Britain meant they largely had to conform to its multi-union environment, 
methods of payment, industrial relations customs and practice or pay the 
price of non-unionism through high wages, the same cannot be said for 
recent Japanese entrants. These latter companies, through collusion with a 
declining and fiercely competitive trade union movement and a strong state 
keen to attract foreign investment, have forced major concessions and 
changes on this 'environment'. Had Japanese capital arrived earlier, their 
factory regimes would be more typically British. The timing of their arrival 
allowed them to impose a labour process and industrial relations system 
suited to their interests (Reitsperger 1986). Moreover, these conditions also 
permitted British 'adopters' of Japanese 'best practice' to push through 
change on the shop floor more thoroughly, or at least forcefully, than would 
have been the case in earlier periods. As such, we could say that dominance 
effects have been stronger than societal contingencies in the instance of 
Japanese transplants (Elger and Smith 1994). Similar claims could be made 
for the impact of Japanese transplants in the U.S. motor industry (Kenney 
and Florida 1991), although, in electronics, Milkman (1992) found more 
evidence of Japanese transplants consciously adopting American anti-union 
'human resource management' practices, because of their economic effi-
cacy, and dominance as the best practice in this sector. Florida and Kenney 
(1994) in a recent paper on Japanese maquiladoraS found they exhibited 
nothing (apart from company uniforms) of the traits and practices associ-
ated with Japanese core plants, but rather conformed to conditions typical 
of the temporary, subcontracting sector in Japan, thus demonstrating the 
power of sector constraints over national contingencies. 
At the level of the firm we may also want to make the distinction between 
the competing influences of society, system and dominance effects, and 
suggest that social agents within the firm are differentially exposed to these 
pressures. Corporate managers in international sectors will be more open to 
'best practice' and different national ways of managing. Research and 
development engineers will make trips to overseas competitors, equipment 
suppliers or international conferences, and to exhibitions which introduce 
them to 'best practice' and societally distinct ways of organising. Now, while 
the identification of 'best practice' is not straightforward, and is particularly 
troublesome across borders (Kogut 1993: 5), and the market in techniques, 
quick fixes and the general commodification of management ideas 
complicates selection, nevertheless, some managers are more likely to 
champion than to resist 'best practice'. Such agents may be a source of 
diffusion of dominant 'best practice', but will compete against others (trade 
unions and production management, for example) who may be more 
defensive of traditional custom and practice derived from the national 
arena. In a recent study of the restructuring of a large confectionery 
company, this differential integration of managers and workers in com-
peting ways of organising, supported diverse rather than linear influences on 
reorganisation and change of work organisation within this company 
(Smith, Child and Rowlinson 1990). 
Instead of restricting the influences on work organisation to what is drawn 
from the national or international economy, comparative research needs to 
examine the particular pattern of interaction between the three influences 
of society, system and dominance. Moreover, rather than treat- ing the firm 
as the recipient of culturally specific and non-specific inputs, it is preferable 
to examine it as differentially embedded within, and as agency shaping the 
effects of, these three levels. 
Finally, while we have separated, for heuristic purposes, society, system 
and dominance effects, in practice such a division may be rather artificial. 
Intercourse between the 'levels', and mutual reinforcement, may make it 
difficult meaningfully to isolate their relative influence. There may also be, 
as we have insisted throughout this paper, a tendency for practices drawn 
from the particular levels to metamorphose from being treated as, say, a 
societal contingent into being a system requirement. Taylorism, as we noted 
earlier, was initially bounded by the constraints of American capitalism; but 
its diffusion transformed it into a 'best practice' which was seen as 
a 'system' requirement in some economies. The institutionalisation of 
Taylorism through engineering departments, business schools, and count-
less factories in a number of advanced societies gave it this 'systemic' 
quality, and allowed critics of it, Braverman (197 4) and others, to confuse 
it as a capitalist ideology par excellence. The identification ofTaylorism with 
American economic success made it difficult to resist. Disentangling the 
three influences of society, system and dominance has always been part of 
the critique of Taylorism as it became a dominant ideology and started to 
diffuse to Europe and Japan; but we could say that it was only with the 
emergence of other dominant capitalist states, in Europe and Japan, that 
such a critique has been able to separate these levels, and identify what in 
Taylorism is specific to America, what is part of capitalism, and what held 
sway only through American economic hegemony and not for intrinsic 
qualities ofTaylorism itself (Aoki 1988). 
The complexities of cross-national studies are increasing because we 
can no-longer assume stable institutions, traditions and practices within 
'nation' states. Globalisation of production is integrating organisations into 
logic's other than those given by national institutions and is facilitating more 
rapid learning and diffusion of new or 'best practice' from dominant 
societies. The co-existence of several dominant states strengthens pluralism 
and eclecticism, and global competition and crises add to the problems of 
comparative research. This paper has presented a method to analyse these 
contradictory dynamics and hopefully avoid the major problems we have 
identified with institutionalist and other approaches to cross-national 
analysis. 
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Notes 
1. We are grateful to Arndt Sorge for this phrase. 
2. Maquiladoras are the Mexican border industrialisation programmes to attract 
U.S. companies for labour-intensive production activities which utilise cheap 
Mexican labour for export to the U.S. market (Sklair 1991: 103) 
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